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Administrative Law-Due Process Standards for Quasi-Judicial
Proceedings of Municipal and County Agencies
Quasi-judicial proceedings1 conducted by administrative agencies
have traditionally varied from regular judicial proceedings in the use
by agencies of less formal and more flexible procedural regulations
than those used in fully adversary proceedings.' Procedural informality
has been particularly characteristic of quasi-judicial proceedings con-
ducted by municipal and county agencies. 3 Humble Oil & Refining
Co. v. Board of Aldermen4 raised the issue of whether a municipal
body conducting a quasi-judicial proceeding may exercise discretion
as to compliance with its own procedural rules. In a decision with im-
portant procedural implications for all local governmental agencies in
the state, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that due process con-
siderations required compliance with procedural rules in effect at the
time the proceeding was conducted.5
In Humble, plaintiff acquired options to purchase or lease three
adjoining lots in Chapel Hill. The lots were in a district zoned to
permit construction and operation of service stations upon approval of
a special use permit by the Board of Aldermen. 6 Humble's application
for such a permit was jointly considered by the Aldermen and the Chapel
Hill Planning Board at a duly advertised public hearing as required
by the ordinance. 7 Immediately after receiving testimony in favor of
1. A distinction is made between administrative agency proceedings that are
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory in nature and proceedings that are quasi-legislative or rule-
making in nature. For an explanation of the basis on which this distinction is made see
Daye, North Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act: An Interpretive Analysis,
53 N.C.L. RPv. 833, 838-39 (1975).
2. See generally Daye, supra note 1.
3. See Note, Board of Zoning Appeals Procedure-Informality Breeds Con-
tempt, 16 SynAcusa L Rnv. 568 (1965).
4. 284 N.C. 458, 202 S.E.2d 129 (1974).
5. Id. at 467-68, 202 S.E.2d at 135. The litigation involved two additional issues.
A standing challenge by the Board of Aldermen was decided in Humble's favor with
recognition by the court that a "prospective vendee" under contract to purchase property
may properly apply for or appeal the denial of a variance or special use permit related
to such property. Id. at 464-65, 202 S.E.2d at 133-34. Humble's "inadequate stand-
ards" attack on the validity of the ordinance provisions governing special use permit de-
cisions was rejected. Id. at 471, 202 S.E.2d at 138.
6. Id. at 461, 202 S.E.2d at 131.
7. Chapel Hill, N.C., Ordinance Providing For The Zoning of Chapel Hill and
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and in opposition to the issuance of a special use permit, the Aldermen
voted unanimously ,to deny Humble's application. They did not, how-
ever, refer the application to the planning boards as apparently re-
quired by the ordinance.9 Upon petition by Humble, the Superior
Court of Orange County issued a writ of certiorari and subsequently
sustained the Aldermen's decision. Humble appealed, the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals affirmed, 10 and certiorari was granted by the
North Carolina Supreme Court.
Humble argued that the application denial was arbitrary and a
deprivation of due process from both a procedural and an evidentiary"
standpoint. The procedural attack was based upon a contention that
the ordinance required a referral to the planning board after the public
hearing for an advisory recommendation before the Aldermen could
Surrounding Areas, § 4-B, June 10, 1974. (The Chapel Hill zoning ordinance has been
extensively amended since Humble applied for a special use permit in 1971. Conse-
quently, the ordinance sections cited herein do not coincide with the sections cited by
the court in the Humble opinion, but the relevant provisions are identically worded in
both versions.)
8. 284 N.C. at 465, 202 S.E.2d at 134.
9. The Chapel Hill zoning ordinance authorizes the issuance of special use per-
mits by the Aldermen for specified uses and under specified conditions "after joint hear-
ing with the Town Planning Board and after Planning Board review and recommenda-
tion." Section 4-B-i-a. The Aldermen are directed to "consider the application and
said recommendation and either grant or deny the Special Use Permit requested." Sec-
tion 4-B-1-g.
10. 17 N.C. App. 624, 195 S.E.2d 360 (1973).
11. 284 N.C. at 468, 202 S.E.2d at 135. The Board of Aldermen made a finding
of fact that Humble's proposed service station would increase traffic hazards and endan-
ger public safety. Id. at 469, 202 S.E.2d at 136. The court agreed with Humble's con-
tention that this finding, upon which the application denial was based, was unsupported
by competent evidence. The validity of flexible requirements as to the type of evidence
which may be received in a quasi-judicial proceding was affirmed by the court's holding
that N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-317, -318 (1974) (repealed by Ch. 1331, § 2, [1973] N.C.
Sess. Laws 703, effective July 1, 1975), which required that state agencies to which it
applied must comply with rules of evidence as applied in the superior and district courts,
did not apply to county and municipal agencies. Notwithstanding this latitude as to the
receipt of evidence, the court relied heavily upon the stringent standards established in
Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963), in requiring that
crucial findings of fact be supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.
284 N.C. at 468-71, 202 S.E.2d at 136-37. The Jarrell evidence standards were derived
from N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (1974) (repealed by Ch. 1331, § 2, [1973]
N.C. Sess. Laws 703, effective July 1, 1975), imposed in the context of a quasi-judicial
determination of a "legal" or "property" right. It appears that the court in Humble ex-
tended the Jarrell standards to apply whenever the nature of the proceedings is quasi-judicial, regardless of the nature of the right involved. 284 N.C. at 470, 202 S.E.2d at
137. The evidentiary portion of the court's decision may, however, be influenced by
the repeal of the statutes on which the decision rests and the enactment of the North
Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (Supp.
1974), effective February 1, 1976. It is noteworthy that the new Act expressly excludes
municipal agencies from its coverage. Id. § 150A-2(1) (Supp. 1974). See Daye,
supra note 1, for a thorough description and interpretation of this Act.
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either grant or deny the application.12
The Aldermen argued, and the court of appeals agreed, that the
ordinance provisions meant that a referral to the planning board must
be made before issuance but not before denial of a permit application.
The Supreme Court rejected this construction 13 and held that com-
pliance with the referral provision was required by both due process
and equal protection considerations.' 4 Referral to the planning board
was viewed as a procedural safeguard designed to insure that every ap-
plicant for a special use permit received the same careful, impartial
consideration.' 5 The court ordered the permit denial set aside and a
de novo consideration of Humble's application by the Board of
Aldermen. 16
The strict procedural standards applied by the court in reviewing
this administrative action stand in marked contrast to the highly def-
erential review of local government actions demonstrated in past
decades. 17  There -has, however, been very little prior North Carolina
litigation concerning the competence of a local government administra-
tive agency to depart from its own procedural rules and regulations.' 8
12. 284 N.C. at 465, 202 S.E.2d at 134.
13. The court did not discuss its recent affirmation of the proposition that
"[w]here an issue of statutory construction arises, the construction adopted by those who
execute and administer the law. . . is entitled to 'great consideration,' . . . . It is said
to be 'strongly persuasive' or even 'prima facie correct'." MacPherson v. City of Ash-
ville, 283 N.C. 299, 307, 196 S.E.2d 200, 206 (1973) (citations omitted).
14. 284 N.C. at 467-68, 202 S.E.2d at 135.
15. Id. at 467, 202 S.E.2d at 135.
16. Id. at 471, 202 S.E.2d at 138. This remedy should allow the agency to bet-
ter serve the public interest by providing a "second chance" when the decision is substan-
tively correct but improperly reached. It may be argued that the de novo approach is
too burdensome for applicants. Particularly in the land use context, delays caused by
the improper denial of an application may be fatal to either complex financial arrange-
ments or to the commercial timing of business decisions. It would be anticipated, how-
ever, that agencies will make a good faith effort to comply with this decision. In addi-
tion, future applicants who are improperly denied a permit will have a better chance for
favorable resolution of the conflict in the lower courts. It is also probable that the court
would readily utilize the harsher remedy of ordering that a permit be issued in response
to an unreasonable denial. See In re Application of Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 426, 178 S.E.2d
77, 81 (1970).
17. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. City of Goldsboro, 149 N.C. 128, 62 S.E. 905 (1908).
The court labeled damnum absque injuia the damage of a plaintiff whose elm trees, be-
lieved by the city to pose a potential threat to the city sewer system, were to be removed
by the city without notice or hearing. The court's language illustrates the high level
of deference then accorded local government actions. "[O]ur courts will always be most
reluctant to interfere with these municipal governments in the exercise of discretionary
powers, conferred upon them for the public weal, and will never do so unless their action
should be so clearly unreasonable as to amount to an oppressive and manifest abuse of
their discretion." Id. at 134, 62 S.E. at 908.
18. Keiger v. Board of Adjustment, 281 N.C. 715, 190 S.E.2d 175 (1972), invali-
dated an ordinance amendment attempted without compliance with notice procedures
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One limitation observed by courts in other jurisdictions on agency
deviation from its own rules is the well-settled administrative law prin-
ciple that administrative procedure must embody basic due process
guarantees.1 9 Due process requirements have, however, generally been
interpreted less stringently in the administrative as compared to the
judicial arena.2 ° Even when such basic due process guarantees as
notice or an opportunity to be heard are not involved, however, the
prevailing view in administrative law is that, as a general rule, agencies
engaged in quasi-judicial functions do not have discretion to waive,
suspend, or disregard validly adopted procedural rules.21 There are
recognized exceptions to this general rule where the deviation is not
arbitrary, is made in the interest of justice,22 or results in harmless
error.
2 3
One important aspect of Humble Oil & Refining Co. is its de-
parture from prior North Carolina case law concerning the criteria for
determining the applicable procedural standards for agency determina-
tions. Earlier cases involving the general issue of administrative agency
procedural standards applied more stringent standards when a vested
property right was involved.24 The court in Humble gives quite limited
consideration to the nature of the right involved. It is the quasi-judicial
nature of the proceeding that is stressed at several points in the opinion
as precipitating the imposition of specified standards.2 5 To the ex-
tent that the nature of the proceeding replaces the technical nature of
the right being adjudicated as a determinant of the procedural require-
specified by the ordinance and required by the enabling act. In re Application of Ellis
also involved an amendment adopted without compliance with ordinance provisions, but
this issue was not decided. The court ordered issuance of a permit that had been denied
despite a stipulation that all ordinance requirements for the permit had been met. It
was in the context of the exercise of "unguided discretion" by the Commissioners in de-
ciding whether to grant or deny an application, not in the context of deviation from
an existing procedural rule, that the court in Ellis required the Commissioners to "pro-
ceed under standards, rules, and regulations, uniformly applicable to all who apply for
permits." 277 N.C. at 425, 178 S.E.2d at 81.
19. 2 AM. JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 351 (1962).
20. E.g., id.
21. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974); Yellin v. United States, 374
U.S. 109 (1963); Vitareli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Coleman v. City of Gary,
220 Ind. 446, 44 N.E.2d 101 (1942); State ex rel. Independent School Dist. v. Johnson,
242 Minn. 539, 65 N.W.2d 668 (1954).
22. American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970).
23. Olin Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 192 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 919 (1952); Union Starch & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
24. Compare Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963)
with Craver v. Board of Adjustment, 267 N.C. 40, 147 S.E.2d 599 (1966).
25. See note 11 supra.
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ments to be imposed, this decision has ramifications not only for
special use permit proceedings, but for all quasi-judicial proceedings.20
The probable applicability of this decision to all quasi-judicial proceed-
ings is further supported by the constitutional base on which the court
required the Aldermen to comply with the ordinance provision for a
referral to the planning board.2 7  If due process requirements are
satisfied only by adherence to procedures outlined in the ordinance in
the special use permit context, there is no apparent reason to preclude
similar requirements in other quasi-judicial proceedings.
The primary analytical difficulty with the Humble opinion is the
resulting uncertainty about the reach of the procedural compliance
requirement. Must an agency comply only with those procedural rules
designed to provide procedural safeguards for fundamental rights? Al-
ternatively, is compliance with all procedural rules required?" A
rigid due process requirement of compliance with all procedural rules
would be a broader and more rigid requirement than has been gen-
erally imposed.29 Such a broad requirement could lead to slavish ad-
herence to procedural rules for the sake of uniformity per se and may
well prove detrimental to the purposes that administrative bodies are
uniquely designed to serve: efficiency, speed, volume, flexibility, and
informality.8" On the other hand, a due process requirement of com-
pliance with procedural rules designed to safeguard fundamental rights
is fully justified and in accord with the weight of administrative law
authority from other jurisdictions.31
Even if the opinion is interpreted to require compliance only
26. This analytical innovation should simplify the case law in zoning cases by di-
minishing the importance of technical distinctions between various types of zoning deci-
sions which have a dubious relationship to the importance of the interest involved.
The scope of proceedings viewed as falling within the quasi-judicial category will
also influence the scope of the Humble decision. A well-reasoned opinion in Fasano
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 576, 507 P.2d 23 (1973), characterizes a zoning
change as a judicial function rather than accepting the "legislative" label traditionally
applied to this type of action. Acceptance of the rationale of the Fasano opinion would
greatly expand the proportion of local government decisions that would be viewed as
quasi-judicial and thus be subjected to the more stringent procedural requirements of
Humble.
27. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
28. An affirmative response to this inquiry could be reached by reference to lan-
guage used by the court, "Mhe Alderman must 'proceed under standards, rules, and
regulations uniformly applicable to all who apply . .. .' [A] board of aldermen may
not violate at will the regulations it has established for its own procedure; it must comply
with the provisions of the applicable ordinance." 284 N.C. at 467, 202 S.E.2d at 135.
29. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
30. See Daye, supra note 1, at 845.
31. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
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with procedural safeguards designed to protect fundamental rights,
there is some ambiguity as to what specifically the court viewed in
this case as a fundamental right. It seems obvious that the Aldermen
could legitimately amend the ordinance in the future to delete the
provision for a referral to the planning board so that referral per se
would not constitute a fundamental right. Because the court viewed
the purpose of the referral provision to be the assurance of careful and
impartial consideration of all applications, it may be postulated that
the fundamental right to be protected was the right to uniform treat-
ment with respect to those procedural rules that protect the basic
fairness of the ultimate decision. This interpretation is more plausible
than the alternative that due process demands compliance with all pro-
cedural rules.3 2
Ambiguity about the proper scope of procedural compliance
could have been avoided by a mandatory-directory analysis of the
referral provision of the ordinance in lieu of the due process analysis
used by the court. An accepted distinction in statutory construction
is that failure to comply with a mandatory provision renders the pro-
ceeding to which the provision related illegal and void, whereas com-
pliance with a directory provision is not necessary to the validity of the
proceeding.3 3  In the absence of a statutory stipulation that a given
provision is mandatory, the basic criterion by which a distinction is
made between mandatory and directory provisions is the achievement
of the underlying legislative purpose. The function of this distinction
is to avoid the exaltation of form over substance.3 4 The mandatory-
directory approach thus facilitates a desirable 5 case-by-case examina-
tion of the important competing interests 6 involved, with attention
focused upon the specific interest of the applicant that may be ad-
32. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra for an analysis of why this result
would be undesirable.
33. E.g., Gann v. Harrisburg Community Unit School Dist., 73 I1. App. 2d 103,
218 N.E.2d 833 (1966); Younker Bros., Inc. v. Zirbel, 234 Iowa 269, 12 N.W.2d 219
(1943); Mullen v. DuBois Area School Dist., 436 Pa. 211, 259 A.2d 877 (1969).
34. Mullen v. DuBois Area School Dist., 436 Pa. 211, 216, 259 A.2d 377, 880
(1969).
35. But see Note, 16 SvxAcusE L. REv., supra note 3.
36. See Daye, supra note 1. Professor Daye enumerates the purposes that admin-
istrative bodies are uniquely designed to serve as efficiency, speed, volume, flexibility,
and informality. Id. at 845. Competing interests are identified as "fairness considera-
tions-equitable treatment of persons in like circumstances, notice, opportunity to par-
ticipate, regularized process, articulated reasons for agency action and overall 'ration-
ality' in agency process." Id. A perceptive discussion of the need for and method of




versely affected and upon alternative means of protecting that interest.
Thus, mandatory-directory analysis may result in broader compliance
with procedural rules than would be demanded by due process.
Given the facts of Humble Oil & Refining Co., a mandatory-
directory analysis would have probably yielded the same results reached
by the court through due process analysis. The advantage of the man-
datory-directory analysis would have been a more precise articulation
of the specific circumstances under which compliance with procedural
rules is required. The disadvantage of the approach used by the court
is that a cautious, overlybroad interpretation of the scope of the pro-
cedural compliance standard may well lead to the exaltation of form
over substance.3 7
On balance, this decision makes a significant contribution to the
development of administrative law for municipal and county agencies
in North Carolina. The dramatic increase in ithe number of cases
adjudicated by administrative agencies38 accentuates the importance
of assuring procedural fairness for parties who appear before quasi-
judicial tribunals. The sensitivity demonstrated by the court toward
the protection of procedural fairness, if tempered with recognition of
the uniquely flexible and informal nature of administrative actions by
local governmental agencies, should lead to constructive resolution of
issues not definitively decided by this case.
WENDELL HARRELL OTT
Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy in the Juvenile Courts
The right to be free from double jeopardy, as guaranteed by the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution,1 is an integral part of
the Anglo-American system of justice. "Fear and abhorrence of govern-
37. Similarly, if an agency finds the burden of a rigid and overly-broad procedural
compliance standard excessively onerous, a not unlikely reaction would be to delete by
amendment the provision in question whenever the provision was not a minimum re-
quirement of due process. The imposition of rigid standards designed to enhance pro-
cedural protection of applicants could thus ironically lead to minimum rather than max-
imum procedural protection.
38. See Hanft, Some Aspects of Evidence In Adjudications By Administrative
Agencies in North Carolina, 49 N.C.L. REv. 635, 638-39 (1971).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... .
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